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GENUINE SAVING AND THE VORACITY EFFECT 
Frederick van der Ploeg* 
Abstract
Many resource-rich countries have negative genuine saving rates, so deplete their exhaustible 
natural resource wealth faster than they build up wealth in other assets. This phenomenon is 
stronger in more fractionalized countries with poor legal systems. We explain this by a power 
struggle about the control of natural resources. Competing fractions in society thus have a private
stock of financial assets and a common stock of natural resources. We solve a dynamic common-
pool problem and obtain political economy variants of the Hotelling rule for resource depletion 
and the Hartwick saving rule necessary to sustain constant consumption in an economy with 
exhaustible natural resources. Resource depletion is faster than demanded by the Hotelling rule. 
As a result, the country has negative genuine saving rates and is running down its national wealth. 
The country saves more in financial assets than the current natural resource rents. Still, the 
erosion of natural wealth exceeds the accumulation of financial assets. Even though the power 
struggle boosts output, consumption is sub-optimally low. The highlighted political distortions 
are larger if the country is more fractionalized.  
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Countries rich in natural resources have poor growth performance even after controlling 
for the quality of institutions, openness, the investment rate and initial income per capita (e.g., 
Sachs and Warner, 1995). A rule of thumb based on the Hartwick rule is to save the rents from 
extracting and selling natural resources and invest them in physical capital, infrastructure or 
education.
1 However, in practice, many resource-rich countries save less than that. If they were to 
save more, they might grow at a faster rate. Hamilton and Hartwick (2005), Hamilton, Ruta and 
Tajibaeva (2005) and the World Bank (2006) present estimates of genuine saving. Genuine 
saving is defined as public and private saving at home and abroad, net of depreciation, plus
current spending on education to capture changes in intangible human capital minus depletion of 
natural exhaustible and renewable resources minus damage of stock pollutants (CO2 and 
particulate matter). Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) show that genuine saving thus defined 
corresponds to the increase in the wealth of the nation and that realization of the constant maxi-
min level of consumption demands zero genuine saving.
23  Any depletion of natural resources or 
damage done by stock pollutants must thus be compensated for by increases in non-human and/or 
human capital.  
Figure 1 confirms that countries with a large percentage of mineral and energy rents of 
GNI typically have negative genuine saving rates.
4 Many countries become poorer each year 
despite have abundant natural resources. They squander their natural resources at the expense of 
future generations without investing sufficiently in other forms of intangible or productive 
wealth. This helps to explain why oil-rich Venezuela has negative economic growth while 
Botswana, Ghana and China with positive genuine saving rates enjoy substantial growth. Highly 
resource-dependent Nigeria and Angola have genuine saving rates of minus 30 percent, thus 
clearly impoverishing future generations. The oil/gas states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation also have negative genuine saving rates. 
Oil-rich states such as Nigeria or Venezuela, oil/gas-rich Trinidad and Tobago and copper-rich 
Zambia would have enjoyed an increase in productive capital by a factor four or five if the 
1 The Hartwick rule is first put forward by Hartwick (1977) for the closed economy. Dixit, Hammond and 
Hoel (1980) and Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) discuss it from the point of view of max-min egalitarianism.  
2 In fact, Dasgupta (2001) shows that wealth per capita is the correct measure of social welfare if the 
population growth rate is constant, per capita consumption is independent of population size, production 
has constant returns to scale, and current saving is the present value of future changes in consumption. 
3 The Hartwick rule is related to Hicksian real income. Asheim and Weitzman (2001) and Sefton and Weale 
(2006) show that the rule ensures no change in the present discounted value of current and future utility and 
requires use of the Divisia index of real consumption prices. Capital gains represent the capitalization of the 
future changes in factor prices and thus constitute a transfer from one factor to another. In the closed 
economy net gains are zero and should not be included in real income. 
4 The following resources are included: bauxite, copper, iron ore, lead, zinc, phosphates, silver, gold, oil, 
natural gas, brown coal, hard coal, tin, and nickel. 2
Hartwick rule would have been followed during the past three decades. All these countries 
(except Trinidad and Tobago) have suffered declines in per capita income from 1970 to 2000. 
Of course, countries should save less than their natural resource rents and postpone 
extraction if they anticipate better times. For example, Asheim (1986, 1996) and Vincent, 
Panayotou and Hartwick (1997) show this socially optimal if the world price of natural resource 
is expected to rise in the future. Resource-rich countries should even run a current account deficit 
if natural resource rents fall short of the imputed interest on the value of natural resource reserves, 
which is more likely if the stock of reserves of natural resources is high. Hamilton and Bolt 
(2004) show, however, that the adjustments to allow for future changes in resource prices are 
small if historical price trends are extrapolated. Another reason why it is socially optimal to have 
negative genuine saving rates is if countries expect the cost of resource extraction to fall in the 
future.
5 Furthermore, countries should save less if they expect government spending to fall in the 
future. Without knowing what the expectations are for future developments of the world price of 
natural resources, the cost of resource extraction and government spending, it is difficult to 
accuse resource-rich countries of saving too little.   
However, if there are political factors underlying the observed negative genuine saving 
rates, this is not the case. To see whether this may be important, we examine whether the number 
of competing groups in society might affect genuine saving rates negatively. Figures 2 and 3 give 
a weak indication that countries with a share of mineral rents greater than 5 percent have more 
negative genuine saving rates if they have a high degree of ethnic fractionalization and suffer 
from internal conflict. Corruption is also associated with negative genuine saving rates in 
resource-rich countries. It may thus be worthwhile to develop a political economy explanation of 
why resource-rich countries deplete their natural resources relatively faster than they build up 
other assets. 
Our objective is thus to shed light from a positive perspective on why countries save less 
than natural resource rents. Rival groups are introduced and each one of them tries to grab a share 
of natural resource revenues before others can do so. The problem is that property rights for 
natural resources do not exist or are badly defined. We apply the ideas developed by Lane and 
Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) on how a common-pool problem may give rise to the 
voracity effect to the analysis of the optimal depletion of exhaustible resources and saving in 
5 The US historical experience suggests that under the right circumstances anticipated falls in the cost of 
extraction and thus the downward effect on the nation’s saving may be substantial. The US supremacy as 
mineral producer was driven by big falls in exploration costs from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth 
century, collective learning, leading education in mining/engineering/metallurgy, increasing returns, private 
initiative and an accommodating legal environment; see Habbakuk (1962) and David and Wright (1997). 3
financial assets. We show that the power struggle makes competing groups more impatient and 
thus the country depletes natural resources faster than suggested by the rule first derived by 
Hotelling (1931). As a result, the country experiences negative genuine saving rates which 
depresses the sustainable level of consumption and harms social welfare (the voracity effect). We 
also show that the Hartwick rule must be modified for these political distortions. The only way 
for each group to sustain a constant level of private consumption is for the economy as a whole to 
save more than natural resource rents. Still, genuine saving will be negative as the price of natural 
resources is initially too low and rises too fast. Consequently, erosion of natural wealth exceeds 
accumulation of financial wealth. We also establish that the political distortions in the Hotelling 
and Hartwick rules are bigger if the country is more fractionalized. We derive our results for a 
closed economy with natural resources as a factor of production. We show that the non-
cooperative saving rate is greater than the production share of natural resources, but less than the 
production share of capital. The interest rate and the output-capital ratio gradually fall to zero. 
Genuine saving is negative, so that the country is impoverished all the time and can only sustain a 
sub-optimally low level of consumption. Hence, a fractionalized society experiences negative 
genuine saving and sustains a smaller level of consumption than a homogenous society.  
I. Political distortions in the Hotelling and Hartwick rules 
N rival groups struggle for power over the control of natural resources. Each group i grabs a share 
Vi of natural resource reserves S. Depletion of the stock of natural reserves is thus given by: 
(1) 00 0
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where Rj denotes the depletion rate of group j in society. The natural resource stock is a common
stock, since it is depleted by all groups in society. This captures the idea that property rights on 
natural resources do not exist or are badly defined.  
Each group i also accumulates private assets Ki. Since we abstract from adjustment costs, 
taxes, etc., the relative price of financial assets is unity and the value of private assets exactly 
equals the capital stock. The capital stock of each group can be viewed as physical capital or 
human capital. Each group i employs capital, natural resources Ri and labor Li to produce output 
Yi. The production function for each group Yi = F(Ki, Li, Ri) satisfies the Inada conditions and 4
displays constant returns to scale. We assume that natural resources are necessary for production, 
so F(Ki, Li, Ri) = 0. We also assume that natural resources are inessential for production to avoid 
that feasible consumption vanishes when natural resources run out. If there are sufficient 
substitution possibilities between resources and capital or labor, it is possible to generate positive 
levels of output by switching from resource-intensive to capital-intensive modes of production. 
With a CES production function, natural resources are neither necessary nor essential if the 
elasticity of substitution between factors of production exceeds unity. If the elasticity of 
substitution is less than unity, capital accumulation cannot compensate for the unavoidable 
decline in the use of natural resources and output and consumption must decline to zero. The 
economy is then doomed, so that natural resources are essential for production. We therefore 
assume that each group has a Cobb-Douglas production with a unit elasticity of factor substitution 
and a share of capital in value added greater than that of natural resources, i.e., 
. Natural resources are thus necessary, but not essential for 
production.
1 ,0 , ii i i YK R L
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6 We assume that there is no depreciation of capital. We assume that total labor supply 
in the country is one and that each group is the same. If consumption by group i is denoted by Ci,
the evolution of private wealth of group i is given by: 
(2)         
1 ,   where     and  1/ , ii i i i i i i KYC YK R L L N
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where labor supply is exogenous and equal to 1/N. We abstract from extraction costs for natural 
resources. Suppose that the depletion of the common resource by each group is conjectured to be 
proportional  to the remaining stock of resources divided by the accumulated wealth of the group: 
(3)                 / , 1,.., , jj j R SK j N V   
where Vj will be referred to as the depletion coefficient. It follows that in this closed economy 
each group i maximizes its utility 
(4)    
0 u( )exp( )dt, u' 0,u" 0, ii UC t U
f
  ! ³ d
6 If D < E, capital does not add enough to production to compensate for the declining use of natural 
resources and sustain a positive level of private consumption. Resources are then essential for production. 5
subject to the evolution of the common stock (1), the evolution of the private stock (2) and (3) 
with the conjectures about the depletion coefficients of the other groups in society, Vj , j z i,
where U indicates the pure rate of time preference employed by each group.  
A. Optimality conditions for the feedback Nash equilibrium outcome
We thus derive for this differential game a feedback Nash equilibrium solution with consistent 
conjectures based on the class of feedback policy rules (3). The Hamiltonian for group i is: 
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where Oi and Pi denote the marginal utility for group i of an extra unit of private capital and the 
common stock of natural resources, respectively. Application of Pontryagin’s maximum principle 
yields the following first-order conditions for group i:
(6)
1
u'( ) 0, 0,
                            and  .
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Equation (6) implies that the marginal product of natural resources should equal the price of 
natural resources, pi { Oi /Pi , and that the price of natural resources should rise at the rate of 
interest ri plus an extra term proportional to the sum of the depletion rates of all groups. 
Furthermore, the marginal product of capital should equal the rate of return on capital for each 
group. Since in symmetric equilibrium the interest rates and natural resource prices are the same 
for each group, we can drop group subscripts and write these efficiency conditions as: 
(7)
11











         { { V ¦ ¦

Equation (7) is the political variant of the Hotelling rule. If there is no fractionalization of society, 
N = 1 and (7) reduces to the familiar Hotelling rule which states that the expected rate of increase 
in natural resources should exactly equal the market rate of interest. This follows from the 6
arbitrage condition that on the margin one should be indifferent between, on the one hand, 
keeping natural resources under the ground and receiving a capital gain  / p p  , and, on the other 
hand, digging the resources up, selling them and receiving a rate of return r. Rival groups in 
society drive a wedge in the Hotelling rule. Effectively, each group downplays the capital gain on 
natural resources as it expects other groups to deplete the common stock of natural resources if it 
postpones depletion. As a result, the political Hotelling rule implies a bigger rate of increase in 
the price of natural resources than is socially optimal. This distortion is smaller if the groups have 
accumulated a lot of non-resource wealth relative to the stock of resource wealth. 
Equation (6) also implies the Keynes-Ramsey rule for growth in private consumption: 









where Ti {uc(Ci)/Cius(Ci) t 0. Following the literature on the Hartwick rule, we are interested 
in max-min egalitarian outcomes with zero elasticities of intertemporal substitution (i.e., Ti = 0). 
We are thus looking for dynamic general equilibrium paths with constant levels of private 
consumption, Ci(t) = C/N > 0, t t 0 with C > 0 a constant. 
B. Sustaining constant levels of private consumption
Consider a feasible program with Ki(t) = I t + K0/N > 0, t t 0 where K0/N is the initial private 
stock of assets of each group. Since investment is constant in such a program, the level of output 
Yi(t) = I + C/N is constant as well. Aggregating and making use of the product market 
equilibrium condition (2) yields aggregate use of natural resources in production: 
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Substituting (9) into the depletion of natural reserves equation (1), integrating and solving gives: 
(10)        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The level of aggregate private consumption that can be sustained is obviously larger if the initial 
stock of private assets and common stock of natural reserves are higher. For a meaningful 
solution to exist, one must have D > E. If this is not the case, output cannot be sustained at a 
constant level with a finite stock of natural resources even if all of output is saved. Consequently, 
if D < E, private consumption eventually vanishes.
7 We also have from substituting R(t) from (10) 
into the depletion equation (1) and integrating, the trajectory for the stock of natural resources: 
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The stock of natural reserves is thus asymptotically fully depleted. 
  The solution trajectories for capital, natural resources, output, the interest rate and the 
price of natural resources are pinned down once we know the hypothesized value of I. To find 
this value, we must make use of the static and dynamic efficiency conditions summarized in (7). 
This yields the following relationship between the aggregate depletion coefficient V and the 
constant I:
(12)    00 0
1
(t ) ( t )
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Combining (3), (10) and (11) yields another relationship between V and I and thus the depletion 
rate of the common stock of natural resources: 
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Hence, the aggregate depletion coefficient is constant in non-cooperative equilibrium while the 
depletion rate itself declines with time and vanishes asymptotically. 
7 Natural resources are also essential if physical capital depreciates in a radioactive manner, but not if 
depreciation is linear or proportional to output. 8
C. Zero genuine saving in a homogenous society 
Consider a society without any rival fractions. In that case, N = 1 so that (12) and (13) yield: 
(14)
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
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Making use of (10) and (14), we establish that the saving rate of a homogenous society equals: 









This is the celebrated Hartwick rule, which states that the country should save all its natural 
resource rents and thus that the saving rate should exactly equal the share of natural resources in 
value added E. The aggregate genuine saving rate of the economy is, however, given by: 
(16)    











The Hartwick rule requires that the depletion of natural wealth is exactly compensated by 
accumulation of physical capital, hence genuine saving must be zero. We will show that this 
result does not hold in a fractionalized society. In a homogenous society it is possible to sustain 
constant levels of private consumption, output and investment. Investment is positive and 
compensates exactly for the loss in natural wealth. The value of natural resources extracted at 
each point of time pR does not change over time, so that the depletion level of resources falls at 
exactly the same rate as the price of resources appreciates. This rate is, of course, the market rate 
of interest in a homogenous society, which declines over time and vanishes asymptotically. This 
is also the case for the fraction appropriated from the stock of natural resources (i.e., R/S = V/K).
D. Negative genuine saving in a fractionalized society
With many rival fractions (N > 1), we substitute (13) in (12) and solve for aggregate investment: 9
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We thus find that the saving ratio can be written as: 
(15c)
(t)
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A fractionalized society saves more than the natural resource rents, so that the saving rate exceeds 
E. As the number of rival fractions increases, the saving rate rises gradually from E towards D.
The constant level of output is readily seen to be higher in more fractionalized societies. The 
aggregate genuine saving rate of a country with N rival fractions is given by: 
(16c)              
2 (t) (t) (t) ( 1)
(t) (t) 0  if   1.
(t) ( 1)
G











A fractionalized society thus has a negative aggregate genuine saving rate. Furthermore, as the 
number of rival fractions increases, the genuine saving rate becomes even more negative. 
Rapacious appropriation of natural resources leads to too rapid depletion rates and too rapid 
appreciation of natural resource prices compared with the socially optimal depletion rates and 
natural resource prices implied by the Hotelling rule. It follows that the erosion of the value of 
natural resource wealth is too rapid. It even exceeds the accumulation of financial assets, so that 
genuine saving is negative. The political determinants of this dynamic common-pool problem 
follow from the lack of effective property rights for natural resources. They help to explain why 
many fractionalized resource-rich countries experience negative genuine saving rates, especially 
if the quality of their legal system is poor. As a result, each group consumes less than they would 
do in the absence of the voracity effect. To see this, note from (14c) that w(NI)/wN > 0 and from 
(10) that wC/w(NI) =  ( DE)(N1)/DN < 0 if N > 1. It follows that wC/wN <0 if N > 1. 
Effectively, fractionalization boosts saving and investment more than output. Hence, the more 
fractionalized a society, the less each group ends up consuming. Rapacious rent seeking hurts 
consumption by the members of each group and harms social welfare. 10
Proposition: In the absence of well-defined property rights for natural resources and rival 
groups in society, the rate of resource depletion and appreciation of the price of natural 
resources are faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule. Consequently, natural resource wealth 
diminishes too quickly. Still, the nation saves more than its natural resource rents and thus the 
saving rate exceeds the national income share of natural resources. The accumulation of 
financial assets is insufficient to make up for the decline in natural resource wealth, hence 
genuine saving is negative and the country becomes poorer all the time. Output increases by less 
than saving and investment, so that consumption is sub-optimally low. These political distortions 
become bigger as the country becomes more fractionalized. 
E. Comment
A strong government could correct for the political distortions by levying a tax on natural 
resource use by each group and rebating the revenues in a lump-sum fashion. This would correct 
for the intertemporal distortion in the Hotelling rule and return the economy back to the Hartwick 
rule. Such a policy slows down the rate of natural resource depletion and returns private 
consumption back to its socially optimal level. Of course, a resource-rich country with strife 
about natural resources is unlikely to have a strong government. 
In the closed economy model of capital accumulation and natural resource depletion 
capital grows ad infinitum while the rate of interest and the depletion rate decline to zero. If 
positive total factor productivity growth is introduced, there may be a steady state with a positive 
interest rate and a positive depletion rate (e.g., Dasgupta and Heal, 1974). It can be shown that the 
qualitative insights of the dynamic common-pool problem and the political variants of the 
Hotelling and Hartwick rules are not affected.  
Like most discussions of the Hartwick rule, we have adopted a max-min egalitarian perspective 
and used a zero elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If groups adopt a positive elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution (Ti > 0), levels of private consumption will not be constant. If 
consumption is initially held for some time below its max-min level, capital is accumulated at a 
sufficiently fast pace to ensure that later generations enjoy ever-increasing levels of consumption. 
While resource use declines to zero, unlimited growth in consumption and output is feasible. The 
Keynes-Ramsey rule (8) implies that, as long as the rate of time preference is strictly positive, the 
capital stock must ultimately go to zero as well to ensure that growth in private consumption is 
non-negative. It is thus optimal to let consumption, output and capital vanish in the long run even 
though it is feasible to not have such a doomsday scenario. Future generations are thus doomed, 11
but from a utilitarian perspective that does not matter as the benefit to early generations exceeds 
the loss to later generations. Rival groups in a fractionalized society bring forward consumption 
even more, which is also happens if groups are impatient and find intertemporal substitution easy 
(large U or T). Obviously, it is hard on ethical grounds to defend the socially optimal outcome for 
a homogenous society. This is why the max-min egalitarian outcome seems preferable.  
II. Conclusion 
The negative genuine saving rates of many resource-rich countries damage their growth prospects 
and harm welfare. Undoubtedly, they perform better if they invest their exhaustible resource rents 
as suggested by the Hartwick rule. If competing groups fight to get a big share of natural resource 
revenues, they deplete natural resource reserves faster than implied by the Hotelling rule. As a 
result, resource prices rise to fast. This follows from the impatience induced by such power 
struggles and common-pool problems. We have shown that this gives a political explanation of 
negative genuine saving rates. To sustain constant private consumption, the country needs to save 
more than the natural resource rents. The voracity effect implies that the people accumulate less 
financial assets and have less to consume in a society with rival groups fighting about natural 
resource revenues. We have shown that these political distortions in the Hotelling and Hartwick 
rules are especially large in countries with a large degree of fractionalization and poor legal 
systems. People really are worse off. 
More work is needed on how the Hotelling rule and the Hartwick rule should be modified 
for practical policy formulation. We have shown that natural resource revenues may be siphoned 
off by the political elite and their cronies and thus not reach the people. Less natural resource 
rents will thus be saved. Furthermore, natural resource bonanzas may induce exuberant public 
spending based on the incorrect assumption that windfall natural resource revenues are 
permanent. This leads to unsustainable spending levels with painful adjustments when resource 
revenues run out. It is important to study how advice on optimal rates of resource depletion, 
government spending, saving and investment survives when politicians seek office and grab 
resource rents for themselves or to pay off political opponents and get away with it due to poor 
institutions, bad legal systems and poor checks and balances in the political system. Rapacious 
rent seeking implies that many resource-rich, fractionalized countries with poor legal systems 
squander their natural resource rents and suffer disastrous economic and social outcomes. 12
Finally, many poor resource-rich economies have to cope with high population growth 
rates. Such countries need positive rather than zero genuine saving rates to maintain constant 
consumption per head, since genuine saving may be positive while wealth per capita declines 
(e.g., World Bank 2006, Table 5.2). Such countries are on a treadmill and need to save more than 
their exhaustible resource rents, but rarely manage that. For them the political distortions arising 
from the voracity effect are particularly painful. 
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